Phenomenology is commonly understood in either of two ways:
Key Figures in Naturalistic Epistemology a. Quine usually gets credit for initiating the contemporary wave of naturalistic epistemology with his essay, "Epistemology Naturalized.
Quine's argument depends on three potentially controversial assumptions. First is confirmation holism - the view that only substantial bodies of theory, rather than individual claims, are empirically testable. Second, Quine assumes epistemology's main problem is to explain the relationship between theories and their observational evidence.
Third, he assumes there are only two ways to approach that problem. In Quine's view, the second approach cannot succeed, and so we are left with psychology.
The idea behind reconstructing theoretical vocabulary in sensory terms is to model epistemology on studies in the foundations of mathematics. Such studies show how to translate mathematical statements into the language of logic and set theory, and they show how to deduce suitably translated mathematical theorems from logical truths and set theoretic axioms.
This allows us to judge the strength of our justification in believing mathematical claims: Logical Empiricists such as Rudolf Carnap sought a similar account of our justification for believing scientific theories.
Given a translation of theoretical claims into observational vocabulary, we might be able to show how our theories could be derived logically from observation sentences, logical truths, and set theory. Such a project could not be a complete success. For one thing as Carnap was well awareour theories cannot be derived logically from observations - the theories include generalizations covering unobserved cases.
Nevertheless, such philosophers as Carnap thought the translation of theory into observational terms would be useful. It would allow us to see just how far our theories outstrip their observational evidence.
Quine emphasizes a second reason why the reconstructive approach must fail: Theoretical statements cannot, in general, be translated into purely observational vocabulary. To effect such translations, we would need to identify the observational conditions of verification or disconfirmation for individual theoretical statements.
But, as Quine argues in his other most famous essay, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," individual theoretical statements do not have unique conditions of verification or disconfirmation.
Rather, we must test theoretical statements in groups large enough to have observational consequences, and the results confirm or disconfirm the groups as wholes. When the observations a theory predicts do not pan out, there is typically a wide range of adjustments we could make in response.
We might, for example, give up the claim that this liquid is an acid, or the claim that this is a piece of litmus paper, or the claim we are not hallucinating, and so forth. So, Quine's assumption of confirmation holism undermines the possibility of reconstructing theoretical vocabulary in observational terms.
Consequently, the reconstructionist approach cannot succeed. Given Quine's other assumptions, then, the only method left for epistemology is the psychological method: Knowledge thus approached is a natural phenomenon, the outcome of a natural process whereby sensory stimulation leads to theories about the world.
To understand the connection between the stimulation and the theories - and to understand how far beyond the stimulation our theories go - we study the process scientifically. The point is not to "reconstruct" the transition, but to understand it as it actually occurs.
Quinian naturalistic epistemology is thus "contained" in psychology as a subdiscipline. Quine also notes, however, that there is a sense in which naturalistic epistemology "contains" the rest of science.
Our theories and beliefs about the world, which constitute our science, are part of epistemology's subject matter. Because they "contain" one another, epistemology and the rest of science can be mutually constraining. Not only should our scientific theories pass epistemic muster, but our epistemological theories must fit appropriately with the rest of our scientific worldview.
This conception of the relationship between science and epistemology contrasts vividly with the traditional view of epistemology as "queen of the sciences.
Alvin Goldman Unlike Quine, Alvin Goldman is concerned with such traditional epistemological problems as developing an adequate theoretical understanding of knowledge and justified believing. Also in contrast to Quine, he does not see epistemology as part of science. Instead, Goldman thinks that answering traditional epistemological questions requires both a priori philosophy and the application of scientific results.
As he often puts it, Goldman's naturalism is the view that epistemology "needs help" from science. Goldman's theory of knowledge is a form of causal reliabilism. On such a view, a justified true belief counts as knowledge only if it is caused in a suitably reliable way.
To be "suitably reliable," a belief-forming process must have a propensity to produce more true beliefs than false ones, and the process's own causal ancestry must have a greater propensity to produce reliable processes than unreliable ones.
Though Goldman argues for this view of knowledge on primarily a priori grounds - for example, by considering how well it captures our intuitive classifications of beliefs as cases of knowledge or not - the theory itself gives empirical science an important place in our understanding of knowledge.
The most obvious place where psychology matters in this theory of knowledge is in the identification and evaluation of belief-forming processes.
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Sensory integration is the process by which we receive information through our senses, organize this information, and use it to participate in everyday activities.
There Are More than 5 Senses Most people are familiar with five senses – .